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"critical dialog" with the nonbeliever that the significance for truth of the soundness of an argument is underplayed.
The diffidence displayed in natural theology vanishes when an appeal is made
to religious experience and special revelation. Non-mystical, psychologically
immediate, experiences of God mediated through his creation, his acts in history,
a hymn, etc., are held to provide prima-facie evidence, which, having been
checked against overriders, can be considered ultima-facie evidence. A similar
confidence comes through the receipt of special revelation, with its "'authenticating miracles. '" Where such appeals leave the dialog with the nonbeliever is
not clear.
The book concludes with a balanced, sensitive treatment of the role one's
personal faith plays in the "critical dialog" with the nonbeliever and his objections.
The believer is advised to make a cumulative case a la Basil Mitchell, based on
"less-than-algorithmic evidence" admitting of logical, and a modicum of existential, doubt.
Given the limitations in length and readers' background, the treatment of the
religious language problem could have been shortened in favor of the chapter
on objections to theism. Not only would this have made a somewhat compressed
chapter more understandable to the neophyte, but it would impress the nonbeliever
with the seriousness with which the dialog with him is being taken. Nonetheless,
the book is an authoritative, concise survey of the subject which should be
unusually effective in making the Christian faith more "rationally convincing."

Reason Within the Bounds of Religion, by Nicholas Wolterstorff. 2nd edition.
Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1984. Pp. 161.
GARY GUTTING, University of Notre Dame.
The first edition (1976) of Nicholas Wolterstorff's Reason Within the Bounds of
Religion dealt with the intellectual integrity of Christian scholarship. Its main
thesis was that Christian doctrine may and should act as a constraint on the sorts
of positions a Christian scholar holds in his area of expertise. This thesis conflicts
with the standard modem view of inquiry as the unrestricted pursuit of truth
wherever evidence and argument lead. Wolterstorff maintained that the ideal of
unrestrained inquiry is defensible only on the basis of epistemological foundationalism; only, that is, if there is available a body of certainties (the foundation
of knowledge) from which all valid knowledge claims can be derived. He attacked
foundationalism, arguing first that foundationalists have given no adequate explication of how knowledge claims are derived from the foundations and, second,
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tha1 in any case the body of certain truths available to us is not sufficient to
yield all of our legitimate knowledge claims. Given the untenability of foun
dationalism, he maintained, we have no alternative but to base our inquiry on
what we find ourselves believing. "Confronted as we are with the fact that we
lack a shared foundation, each of us has no choice but to one's own self be true"
(p. 66). Accordingly, Wolterstorff concluded that it is entirely appropriate for
the Christian scholar to let his faith control the positions he takes in his discipline.
This defense of Christian "control beliefs" is reprinted here as Part I of the
second edition of Reason Within the Bounds of Religion. It remains a clear and
stimulating starting-point for reflections on the intellectual integrity of scholarship
informed by Christian faith. There are, however, some major gaps in Wolterstorff's argument. For one thing, he considers only the form offoundationalism
that requires foundational beliefs to be the sort of indubitable truths that could
withstand Cartesian doubt. By ignoring less stringent versions offoundationalism
(e.g, those of Aristotle and Aquinas), he makes it unfairly easy to show that
the foundations are not sufficient to support the full extent of our knowledge.
Further, he does not justify his move from the inadequacy of foundational ism
to the legitimacy of basing our inquiry on whatever we happen to believe at a
given time. Even if there is no body of indubitable truths available as a foundation
of knowledge, it does not follow that all our de facto beliefs are legitimate bases
of inquiry. On these issues Wolterstorff's discussion needs (as his preface to the
second edition suggests) supplementing with his own more recent work as well
as that of Alston, Plantinga, et a1.
Part II of this second edition consists of a new essay (of some 35 pages) that
turns from the question of the intellectual integrity of Christian scholarship to
the complementary question of its moral integrity. Wolterstorff begins with some
reflections on the Christian conception of the goal of human existence. As he
notes, mainline Christian tradition has defined this goal solely in terms of knowledge and enjoyment of God, with no explicit reference to our relations to nature
and to other human beings. Wolterstorff proposes, however, that the latter relations should be included and that this be done by taking the goal of human
exist(~nce to be peace (shalom), construed, it is highest form, as enjoyment of
God, nature, and one's fellows (and as including justice as an essential component) Accordingly, Wolterstorff holds that the moral justification of Christian
scholarship must be its contribution to shalom.
His next step is to argue that knowledge as such has intrinsic value and hence
is om aspect of shalom. Thus, although he agrees that knowledge may also have
value as a practical means of improving our condition ("praxis-oriented theory"),
he rejects the idea that scholarly work is justified only by the usefulness of its
results. But he further holds that scholars can have obligations to aid in attaining
practical ends and that the pursuit of theory simply for the inherent worth or
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personal interest of the knowledge sought ("pure theory") cannot always be
counted on to yield, of itself, sufficiently useful results. Accordingly, he concludes that the Christian scholar's choices of research topics must keep in mind
both the intrinsic worth of his work and the utility of its results. "He cannot
engage in praxis-oriented theory without first considering the claims of knowledge
which is of intrinsic worth; and he cannot engage in pure theory without first
considering the claims of the inherent results and utility of knowledge" (p. 133).
Many may see this as an uncontroversial, middle-of-the-road position; but
Wolterstorff suggests that it differs significantly from traditional Christian ideas
about scholarship. Just as Christian concepts of the goal of human existence
have typically mentioned only our relation to God, so traditional Christian conceptions of knowledge do not order it to any humanly useful goal. Indeed, the
two sorts of conceptions seem to merge in the classic view of Augustine and
Aquinas that the highest form of knowledge, the intellectual contemplation of
God, is the goal of human existence. Wolterstorff see this classic Christian view
as "a profoundly different perspective from that which I have outlined" (p. 139).
Similarly, he criticizes the later "traditional Protestant view" of knowledge for
having "all too often encouraged the irresponsible pursuit of pure theory when
praxis-oriented theory was called for" (p. 142).
Like his treatment of intellectual integrity, Wolterstorff's discussion of the
Christian scholar's moral integrity is a good starting-point for reflection. But,
also like the earlier discussion, his treatment has some important gaps. Particularly, it seems to me, Wolterstorff does not sufficiently justify his claim to put
forward a position that differs "profoundly" from the classical Christian view.
His discussion seems to confuse the question of the ultimate goal of human
existence, which classical Christianity surely does see as a contemplative union
with God, with the question of the goal of scholarship here on earth, which
classical Christianity just as surely sees as obligated to minister to human needs.
Here Wolterstorff might well have referred to Thomas Aquinas' subtly balanced
analysis of the relative merits of the contemplative life and the active life (Summa
Theologiae II-II, q. 182). While maintaining the intrinsic ultimate superiority of
the purely contemplative life, Aquinas nonetheless insists that "the necessity of
present life" may well require us to subordinate contemplation to the practical
goals of an active life (cf. q. 182, a. 1, end of respondeo).
Another gap in Wolterstorff' s discussion concerns the question of whether the
pure theory he defends is even possible or whether all theory is implicitly praxisoriented (as, e.g., Marxists and Freudians often suggest). Wolterstorff mentions
this difficulty on his final pages but merely rejects it without, as he admits,
giving it the consideration it deserves. This is unfortunate, since the question of
the "purity" of pure theory is currently the most pressing challenge not only to
Wolterstorff's position but to the fundamental project of scholarship as we con-
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ceive and live it. Here I think the most significant difficulties come not from
standard Marxist and Freudian views but from Michel Foucault's disconcerting
analyses of the historical development of reason in the West, with their suggestion
that rationality is itself just a particularly subtle and effective means of practical
domination. I would very much like to see Wolterstorff apply his acute and
sensitive mind to this challenge.

